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LEGALITY AND PROPRIETY OF AGREEMENTS TO
ARBITRATE MAJOR AND MINOR DISPUTES
IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
In traditional collective bargaining, economic warfare sets the
tone for the confrontation between labor and management. Because the
strike has been universally' banned in public employment,2 this tone
disappears when government is the employer. If collective bargaining
in the public sector is to amount to more than "consultative manage-
ment," some substitute for the strike must be devised. Arbitration has
sometimes been suggested as such a substitute,3 but the legality of
arbitration in resolving disputes in public employment has often been
questioned.4 On close examination, however, illegality arguments are
frequently based on policy preferences rather than legal principles.
This dichotomy warrants greater attention. With only a few exceptions,
this Note will focus on binding arbitration, rather than on clearly legal
advisory arbitration.5 To facilitate analysis, arbitration of minor dis-
putes and arbitration of major disputes will be discussed separately. 6
I
MINOR DisPuTEs
A. Legality
1. State and Local Level
Although it is estimated that ninety-five pet cent of all union
contracts negotiated in private industry contain provisions for arbitra-
I The recent case of School Dist. of Holland v. Holland Education Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314,
157 N.V.2d 205 (1968), has made some inroads on this uniformity.
2 E.g., Labor Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 118p-118r (1964); N.Y. CxV.
SERv. LAv § 210 (McKinney Supp. 1967). See K. HANSLOWE, THE EMERGING LAW OF
LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 12 (1967); Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1142, 1159-61
(1953).
8 E.g., R. DOHERTY & W. OaBkRk, TEACHERS, SCHOOL BOARDS AND COLLEcriVE BAR-
GAINING: A CHANGING OF THE GUARD 104 (1967); Shenton, Compulsory Arbitration in the
Public Service, 17 LAB. LJ. 138 (1966).
4 E.g., Belenker, Binding Arbitration for Government Employees, 16 LAB. L.J. 234
(1965); Doherty, The Law and Collective Bargaining for Teachers, 68 TEACHERS COLLEGE
RaC., No. 1 (1966).
5 There is one exception, discussed infra at pp. 134-35. Advisory arbitration is
essentially no different from fact finding with the power to recommend.
6 "Minor disputes" shall be defined as those concerning interpretation and/or
application of an existing labor contract, whereas "niajor disputes" will be considered
those concerning the terms of employment to be incorporated into a collective bargaining
agreement.
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tion of either grievances or interpretation of the application of the
contract,7 relatively few such provisions exist in public employment.8
Recently, however, a trend has. developed toward arbitration as the
final step in public employment grievance procedures.9 Such agree-
ments have been entered into in New York City;10 New Haven, Con-
necticut;"' Dayton, Ohio;12 and Racine, Wisconsin.13 Of thirty-nine
contracts recently signed by the American Federation of Teachers,
thirteen provided for binding arbitration by a neutral third party as
the final step in the grievance procedure.14 Thus, despite all the claims
and predictions of illegality, binding arbitration of minor disputes is
gaining acceptance at state and local levels.
a. Court decisions. Early decisions uniformly held that arbitration
of grievances by government employers was an unlawful delegation
of governmental power.' One of the earliest cases to indicate that arbi.
tration might be used at all was Norwalk Teachers' Association v.
Board of Education.'6 The court limited its approval to agreements to
arbitrate specified grievances, exempting questions of policy. By way
of dictum, the court indicated that an agreement to submit to arbitra-
tion all disputes over interpretation and application would probably
be illegal.17
Recently, however, several courts have upheld the use of binding
arbitration as part of a governmental employer's grievance procedure.
In Local 1226, AFSCME v. City of Rhinelander," the parties had
agreed to binding arbitration as the final step in the grievance proce-
dure. After determining that a valid grievance existed, the union pro-
cessed it through the first four steps in the grievance procedure. Dis-
satisfied with the results, the union then named its member of the
arbitration panel as provided in the agreement. The city refused to
name its arbitrator or to follow the procedures set out for naming the
third member of the panel. An action was then brought by the union
7 C. SCHMIDT, JR., H. PARKER & B. R.P's, A GUIDE To COLLECrvE NEGOTIATIONS IN
EDUCATION 70 (1967).
8 BNA Gov'T Emp. REL. REP. No. 183, A-1, A-2 (Mar. 13, 1967).
9 Id.; C. SCHMIDT, JR., H. PARKER & B. REvAs, supra note 7, at 70-71.
10 Wolf, Grievance Procedures for School Employees, in EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RE-
LATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 133, 135 (R. Doherty ed. 1967).
11 Killingsworth, Grievance Adjudication in Public Employment, 13 APB. J. (n.s.) 8,
9 (1958).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 BNA GOV'T Emp. REL. REP. No. 183, A-1, A-2 (Mar. 13, 1967).
15 E.g., Mugford v. Mayor and City Council, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945).
16 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
17 Id. at 279-80, 83 A.2d at 487.
18 35 Wis. 2d 209, 151 N.W.2d 30 (1967).
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for specific performance of the arbitration clause. On the ground that
the city had no statutory authority to enter into a binding agreement,
the trial court sustained the city's demurrer. The union raised three
issues on appeal: (1) Is the arbitration clause binding on the city?
(2) If so, is the clause specifically enforceable in the courts? (3) Is an
employee's discharge an arbitrable issue under the agreement? The
court answered all three questions in the affirmative and further held
that arbitration of grievances is not an unlawful delegation of the city's
legislative power.
In Local 953, AFSCME v. School District of the City of Benton
Harbor,19 a Michigan court upheld a contract clause providing for
binding arbitration as the fifth step in the grievance process. Only
questions of contract application and interpretation were within the
purview of the arbitration clause; changing the contract was specifically
prohibited.-" The court stated that no law prohibited a public employer
from entering into such contracts; on the contrary, implied power to do
so was given by statute.21 Citing Rhinelander, the court said that the use
of binding arbitration in a grievance procedure, with the arbitrator's
authority limited to contract interpretation, was not an abdication of
any policy-making authority and was therefore lawful. 22
Subsequently the Michigan Labor Mediation Board held, in
Oakland County Sheriff's Department v. Metropolitan Council 23,
AFSCME,23 that binding arbitration as the last step in a grievance
procedure is a mandatory subject of bargaining. There the union
complained that the sheriff had refused to bargain over a compulsory
arbitration provision in the grievance procedure on the basis that he
could not enter into such an agreement because it would detract
from his legal powers, including the power to appoint and discharge
deputy sheriffs at will. The Board held that this power resembled that
of a private employer and could be bargained away. Citing Benton
Harbor, the Board stated that the Michigan Public Employment Rela-
tions Act required the sheriff, as a public employer, to bargain over
conditions of employment and held that the right to work and to retain
employment is one of the most basic conditions of employment.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court recently dealt with this issue
19 BNA Gov'T Eamp. REL. REP. No. 216, E-1 (Oct. 30, 1967) (County Ct. Mich.).
20 Id.
21 Id. at E-2. See also MicfI. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.455(15)-(16) (Supp. 1968).
22 The statute required public employees to bargain over wages, hours and working
conditions and to negotiate an agreement on any question arising thereunder, including
arbitration of grievances. BNA GOV'T EDm'. REL. REP. No. 216, E-1, E-3 (Oct. 30, 1967)
(County Ct. Mich.).
23 BNA Gov'T EmP. 317j. RP. No. 227, F-1 (Mich. Jan. 8, 1968).
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in Tremblay v. Berlin Police Union. 24 The court held that an agree-
ment to submit all unresolved grievances to binding arbitration was
not an unlawful delegation of the city's authority to control the police
department. The court noted, however, that the agreement included a
clause which stated that the arbitration award "shall comply with and
be subordinate to the N. H. State Law. ' 25 The court stated that if this
clause had not been included, the agreement's validity would have been
seriously questioned.
Although these cases indicate that binding arbitration of griev-
ances is lawful, such an opinion is not universally accepted. For exam-
ple, many state courts still declare that collective bargaining in the
public sector is not permissible and that a government may not enter
into any binding agreements with unions representing government em-
ployees.20 In International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 321 v.
Water Works Board,27 the Alabama Supreme Court held that a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the twelfth such agreement between the
parties in thirty years, was unlawful and unenforceable. The court
stated that no such agreement could be lawful without express constitu-
tional or statutory authorization.
This case suggests the relevant distinction. In all cases upholding
agreements providing binding arbitration as the final step in a griev-
ance procedure, the state had enacted a statute authorizing public
employers and employees to enter into both collective negotiations
and binding written contracts. In Alabama, where no such statute
existed, the court would not allow any binding agreements. The
validity of this distinction will be determined after an examination of
selected state provisions.
b. Statutes. In Connecticut, school boards are required to negoti-
ate over and execute a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached on the issues of salaries and other conditions of employment.2 8
This language is certainly as broad as that in the Michigan statute,
which was interpreted in Benton Harbor to include binding arbitration
of grievances. Examples of similar statutory language can be found in
Wisconsin,29 New Hampshire, 0 and New York81 public employment
24 - N.H. -, 237 A.2d 668 (1968).
25 Id. at -, 237 A.2d at 671.
26 See Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1142, 1155-59 (1953).
27 276 Ala. 462, 163 So. 2d 619 (1964).
28 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153(d) (1967).
29 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(i) (Supp. 1968).
80 N.H. R.v. STAT. ANN. § 31:3 (Supp. 1967).
81 N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 204(2) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
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statutes. A recent fact-finding report in New York recommended bind-
ing arbitration as the final step in a grievance procedure, thus adding
support to the argument that such an agreement is legal under New
York's Taylor Law.32
A Massachusetts statute covering municipal employees and teachers
specifically allows binding arbitration of grievances if both parties agree
to its use. 3 A Missouri statute provides for arbitration of grievances
between firemen and their employers."" This survey is not exhaustive,
but it adequately represents the approach in states where statutes allow
collective bargaining in public employment. The vast majority of
states, however, do not have such statutory provisions.
c. Non-statutory jurisdictions. Can a public employer, absent a
statute, lawfully enter into binding contracts with labor unions repre-
senting public employees? In the several states that have answered this
question in the negative, an agreement to submit grievances to binding
arbitration would a fortiori be unlawful. Therefore, for the purposes
of the remainder of this section, it is assumed that the jurisdiction is
one in which the public employer may legally enter into binding con-
tracts with its employees. Why should the public employer not be able
to provide in such a contract for the resolution of disagreements that
arise over its interpretation and application? Opponents of binding
arbitration argue that to do so violates sovereign immunity, but argu-
ably where the government has entered into a binding contract,
sovereign immunity has been waived. A legislature, in authorizing a
governmental unit to enter into a contract, may, by implication, autho-
rize it to sue or be sued thereon.3 5 If the government can be sued on
the contract, then certainly it can agree to submit disputes to binding
arbitration.36 Agreements of this type have frequently been upheld by
the courts and are perfectly lawful as long as the governmental unit
involved has the capacity to enter into the contract in the first place.37
32 BNA Gov'T Emp. RxL. REP. No. 228, E-1 (Jan. 22, 1968).
33 MAss. ANN LAws ch. 149, § 178K (Supp. 1967).
34 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 290.350 (1965). But see Missouri v. Cervantes, BNA Gov'T EMP.
REL. REP. No. 233, D-1 (Feb. 2, 1968) (S. Ct. Mo.), where the supreme court held that this
statute did not apply to St. Louis because it is a constitutional charter city.
35 Watkins v. Department of Hwys., 290 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Ky. 1956). Watkins was sub-
sequently overruled by Foley Constr. Co. v. Ward, 375 S.W.2d 392, 396 (Ky. 1963). See also
Shenton, supra note 3, at 143-44; 5 Am. JUR. 2d, Arbitration and Award §§ 67-68 (1962);
Annot., 40 A.L.R. 1370 (1926).
36 See BNA Gov'T Emp. REL. REP. No. 227, F-2, F-3 (Jan. 15, 1968); Cogan, Are Gov-
ernment Bodies Bound by Arbitration Agreements?, 22 ARB. J. (n.s.) 151, 160 (1967).
37 E.g., Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 279-80, 83 A.2d
482, 487 (1951).
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Thus, there are three preconditions to binding arbitration of
minor disputes: a statute enabling collective bargaining by government
employees; reasonable standards for arbitration; and limitations of the
issues to the "law of the contract." In a jurisdiction where the courts
have held that it is within the public employer's power to enter into a
binding labor contract, despite the absence of such a statute, the con-
clusion should be the same. Where the public employer is prohibited
from entering into a binding labor contract, then ipso facto it would be
prohibited from entering an agreement to arbitrate grievances.
2. Federal Level
The federal government has never made use of binding arbitra-
tion of grievances,33 but Executive Order 10988 has authorized the use
of advisory arbitration. Nearly seventy-five per cent of recent collective
bargaining agreements negotiated by federal employee unions contain
provisions for advisory arbitration of grievances." Although agency
heads often have accepted the results of the arbitration, some such
awards are not followed.4° Civil Service Commission Chairman John
Macy has said that the Commission cannot advise agencies that "they
must invariably comply with arbitration decisions, because this would
be inconsistent with the provisions of Section 8(b) of the Executive
Order" 41 which provides that such arbitration "shall be advisory in
nature. ' 42 The reason usually given for rejecting a decision is that it
would violate a law or a government regulation. 43
In 1953, the Court of Claims, in George J. Grant Construction Co.
v. United States,44 allowed a contract dispute arbitration. Four years
later, however, much of the force was taken out of this decision by the
same court. It noted, in Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States,45 that an
agreement to arbitrate would not be specifically enforceable against the
United States unless it had consented to waive sovereign immunity for
that purpose. This impediment to grievance arbitration could prob-
ably be removed by a change in the Executive Order, at least insofar
88 See Blaine, Hagburg & Zeller, The Grievance Procedure and Its Application in the
United States Postal Service, 15 LAB. L.J. 725, 731-35 (1964).
39 BNA Gov'T EMP. REL. R ,. No. 183, A-1 (Mar. 13, 1967).
40 Id.; see also Rock, Role of the Neutral in Grievance Arbitration in Public Employ-
ment, BNA Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. No. 191, D-1 to D-3 (May 8, 1967).
41 BNA Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. No. 132, A-3 (Mar. 21, 1966).
42 3 C.F.R. 521 (1968), 5 U.S.C. § 631 (1964).
43 Id.; see also Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Rela-
tions, 1964 ABA SErMON OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW 355, 359.
44 109 F. Supp. 245, 247 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
45 153 F. Supp. 397, 399 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
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as the grievance involves a discretionary executive decision. For matters
outside that discretion, a legislative enactment probably would be
necessary.
Critics will undoubtedly charge that such an enactment would be
an unlawful delegation of legislative authority, but the delegation
would certainly be less than that involved in giving the Civil Service
Commission the power to review dismissals, establish wage rates, and
set conditions of employment. This authority has been held not to be
an illegal delegation of legislative power.46 It is difficult to perceive
why the delegation of a much lesser power, the power to interpret and
apply existing collective bargaining agreements, would not also be
valid.
B. Propriety
The basic objection to the propriety of binding arbitration as
the final step in a grievance procedure is similar to the legal arguments
against it; even if the use of arbitration is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative authority, it is at least improper and unwise to "remove from
the.., people a power rested in them. '47 Underlying this argument is
the fear that arbitration may compel management to accept decisions
which violate existing laws or official rules and regulations.48 This
fear is founded on the belief that the arbitrator is going to -ignore the
law and act capriciously. This flies in the face of the American experi-
ence with arbitration and judicial review of arbitration awards.49 Of
the several reasons behind the reluctance of public employers to agree
to binding arbitration of grievances, the most important appears to be
the desire not to relinquish unnecessarily any power to the unions.
Binding arbitration of grievances, however, has much to commend
it. First, the collective bargaining agreement is more meaningful be-
cause the confidence of the workers in the equity of the agreement is
strengthened when they know that any dispute over the meaning of the
contract may be submitted to an impartial third party for decision. 50
Second, it encourages more careful decision making by the government
46 See Shenton, supra note 3, at 143; Blaine, Hagburg & Zeller, supra note 38, at
734-35; Cogan, supra note 36, at 100.
47 Hildebrand, The Public Sector, in FRoNTIERs oF CoLLEcrrv BARGAINING 125, 145-46
(J. Dunlop & N. Chamberlain eds. 1967). See also Howlett, Resolution of Impasses in
Employee Relations in Public Education, in EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE R.LATIONS IN THE PUBLIC
ScHroos 116, 124 (R. Doherty ed. 1967).
48 Blaine, Hagburg & Zeller, supra note 38, at 734. See also BNA Gov'r EMT. REL.
REP. No. 132, A-3 (Mar. 21, 1966).
49 Blaine, Hagburg & Zeller, supra note 38, at 734.
50 Wolf, supra note 10, at 137; Blaine, Hagburg & Zeller, supra note 38, at 730.
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employer. If he knows that his actions may be subjected to the scrutiny
of an arbitrator whose decision will be binding, he will be less likely to
make hasty decisions and more likely to calculate the effect of his
order.51 Third, it would create pressure to settle grievances at lower
levels. The natural reluctance of management officials to have their
decisions reviewed by outside parties reduces the tendency of upper-
level management to uphold unjust decisions made by lower-level
management. 52 Fourth, if the parties must bear the cost of arbitration
by outside parties, they are likely to attempt to resolve their differences
before such expense is incurred.53
The federal government has impliedly agreed to the propriety of
binding arbitration of grievances by requiring it in the Railway Labor
Act,54 which, unlike the Labor Management Relations Act,55 does not
exclude public employers from its provisions. In California v. Taylor,5
the Supreme Court held that the State Belt Railroad, a common carrier
owned and operated by the State of California, was governed by the
Railway Labor Act regardless of the fact that the railroad's employees
were appointed under the state civil service laws. Thus, binding arbi-
tration is already a fact where the public employer is a railroad under
the jurisdiction of the Railway Labor Act.
One of the chief virtues of binding arbitration is that the entire
grievance process is made more meaningful to the grievant, and there-
fore more useful. Where the ultimate arbiter of the dispute is a repre-
sentative of one side of the dispute, adverse decisions will be hard to
accept and the tendency toward alienation will be strong-witness the
experience under the post office grievance procedure.57 Where the ulti-
mate decision is made by a neutral third party, hoWever, the grievant is
much more likely to feel that he has had a fair hearing and the goal
of harmonious relations will be best served. A 1963 study showed that
employer-employee relations usually improved after adoption of griev-
ance arbitration; most of the governmental units questioned recom-
mended that other governmental units adopt such a procedure 59 The
benefits arising from binding arbitration of grievances, and its legality
or the ease with which it could be made legal, invite its adoption.
51 Wolf, supra note 10, at 138.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 § 3(e) 44 Stat. 579 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 153(f (1964).
5 5 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1964).
56 353 U.S. 553, 568 (1957).
57 Blaine, H~ggburg & Zeller, supra note 38, at 732-33.
58 Krislov 9: Schmulowitz, Grievance Arbitration in State and Local Government
Units, 18 An. J. (ns.) i71 (1963).
-- 69 Id. at 173.
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II
MAJOR DisPuTEs
The use of binding arbitration to resolve impasses in bargaining
has been frequently suggested but little used. Perhaps the most widely
known use of binding arbitration came at the conclusion of the recent
New York City Sanitation Department strike. Mayor John Lindsay and
the union agreed to submit their differences to an impartial third party
and to be bound by his decision.6 Mayor Lindsay stated at the time that
City Corporation Counsel J. Lee Rankin had studied the problem and
had assured the mayor that the agreement was completely lawful. 61
A. Legality
1. Voluntary Arbitration
At least two states have statutory provisions specifically allowing
the use of voluntary arbitration. Section 209(2) of the New York
Taylor Act states in part:
Public employers are hereby empowered to enter into written
agreements with recognized or certified employee organizations set-
ting forth procedures to be invoked in the event of disputes which
reach an impasse in the course of collective negotiations. 62
The Taylor Report, although stating that compulsory arbitration was
undesirable,63 advocated the use of voluntary arbitration on an ad hoc
basis.64 Nebraska specifically allows the parties involved in a public
employment dispute, upon mutual agreement, to submit unresolved
bargaining issues to the Court of Industrial Relations for final, binding
arbitration. 5
Where there is no express or implied statutory authorization for
the use of arbitration to solve bargaining disputes, different considera-
tions prevail. Does the official have the power to negotiate a collective
bargaining agreement? May a mayor or an agency head delegate his
lawful authority to a third party? Such power carries with it the implied
power to bargain away some unilateral authority 6 -- the very essence of
60 BNA Gov"r EMP. REL. REP. No. 232, B-8 (Feb. 19, 1968).
61 Id.
62 N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAw § 209(2) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
63 STATE OF NEw YORK GOvERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, FINAL
REPORT 46 (1966) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
64 Id. For a discussion of the New York view that voluntary arbitration is advisable
even though compulsory arbitration is illegal, see R. DOHERTY 9- W. OBERER, supra note
3, at 109.
65 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-820 (1960).
60 See Oakland Co. Sheriff's Dep't v. Metropolitan Council No. 23, AFSCME, BNA
Gov'T Eiep. REL. REP. No. 227, F-i (Jan. 15, 1968) (Mich. Lab. Med. Bd.).
9
1968]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
collective bargaining. Therefore, an official capable of agreeing to a
union contract is also capable of delegating any unilateral authority
that is within his discretion to set conditions of employment. The mayor
cannot, of course, bind the city council; nor can an agency head bind
the state legislature by agreeing to arbitrate a dispute. The legislative
body would not, and could not, be bound to comply with the arbi-
trator's award unless it so consented. To do otherwise would violate the
principle of separation of powers.
There is no good reason, however, why the official could not bind
himself to do all he could to implement the arbitrator's decision. This
ability varies, of course, with the official involved. The Mayor of New
York has tremendous power because of his "slush" fund.67 Mayors and
agency heads with less power may be limited to becoming co-advocates
with the union before the legislative body, urging the requisite appro-
priation, change in law, or regulation.6 8 An agency head cannot raise
taxes or appropriations, but in many cases he has considerable discre-
tion over disbursements within the agency. He could therefore commit
himself to use that discretion to whatever extent possible to meet the
arbitrator's decision. Through these methods, the public official could
meaningfully agree to be bound by the results of arbitration.
All of the above arguments would apply equally to collective bar-
gaining at the federal level but for Executive Order 10988.69 Section
8(b)(2) of that Order has been interpreted to bar even advisory arbitra-
tion of bargaining disputes,70 and would have to be amended or re-
placed before binding arbitration could take place at the federal level.
2. Compulsory Arbitration
Compulsory arbitration is arbitration imposed upon the parties by
law. Several statutes imposing such an obligation on public employers
and employees exist, or have existed, in various jurisdictions.71 These
statutes have been held constitutional so long as they apply only to
employment affected with the public interest and the statute provides
reasonable standards and guidelines for the arbitrator's decision.7 2
67 This "slush" fund consists of monies appropriated for increases in public employee
salaries which are put in the mayor's hands to allocate among the various city employees
as he sees fit.
68 FINAL RE'ORT, supra note 63, at 35-86.
69 3 C.F.R. 521 (1968), 5 U.S.C. § 631 (1964).
70 Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations, in 1966
ABA SECTION OF LABOR RPELATIONs LAw 180, 135.
71 See Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 482, 444 (1957).
72 Id.
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At least five such statutes exist. A Louisiana statute covering all
publicly-owned transportation facilities requires the public transporta-
tion authority, in the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement
through bargaining, to offer to submit the dispute to binding arbitra-
tion.73 In Nebraska any controversy concerning terms, tenure, or con-
ditions of employment between municipally owned utilities and their
employees will be sent to binding arbitration at the request of either
party should an impasse develop.74 A Pennsylvania statute requires
county agencies administering toll bridges, toll roads, and ferry boats
to offer to submit all unresolved disputes to binding arbitration.75 In
Rhode Island two separate acts, one for teachers7 and one for munici-
pal employees, 77 provide for arbitration of unresolved issues at the
request of either party. The arbitrator's decision is final and binding
on all matters not involving the expenditure of money.7 8 Where ex-
penditures are involved, the decision is advisory only.
Since 1947 Minnesota has outlawed strikes by employees of chari-
table, nonprofit hospitals70 and provided for compulsory arbitration of
their labor disputes.8 0 A charitable hospital is defined by the act to
include "all state, university, county and municipal hospitals."' The
statute requires the submission of any unsettled dispute over "maxi-
mum hours and minimum wages" to final and binding arbitration,12
and that phrase has been interpreted broadly to include almost every-
thing but union security.8 3 The statute was upheld in Fairview Hospital
Ass'n v. Public Building Service and Hospital Employees Union, Local
113.s4 The union challenged its constitutionality on three grounds:
(1) denial of equal protection and deprivation of rights without due
process of law; (2) unlawful delegation of legislative power without
adequate standards; and (3) vagueness and lack of susceptibility to
judicial construction. Responding to the first argument, the court
noted that the equal protection clause does not require a law to apply
73 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:890(E) (Supp. 1967).
74 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-801 to -823 (1960).
75 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 55, § 563.2 (1964). This statute was upheld against constitutional
attack in Division 85, A.T.U. v. Port Auth., 417 Pa. 299, 208 A.2d 271 (1965).
76 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-9.3-9 (Supp. 1966).
77 R.I GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-9.4-10 (Supp. 1967).
78 RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.3-12 (Supp. 1966); § 28-9.4-13 (Supp. 1967).
70 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.36 (1966).
80 Id. § 179.36-8.
81 Id. § 179.35(2). (Emphasis added).
82 Id. § 179.38.
83 Fairview Hosp. Ass'n v. Public Bldg. Semy. Employees Local 113, 241 Minn. 523,
64 N.W.2d 16 (1954).
84 Id., noted in 39 MINN. L. REv. 322 (1955).
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with "rigid sameness" to all persons. Rather, only an arbitrary or
unreasonable law will be struck down. The court then held that the
compulsory arbitration section, which limited the bargaining power
of both parties, was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.,5 The second
argument was handled by stating that the basic policy of the statute,8 6
when coupled with the definitions and rules set forth in the sections
prohibiting strikes and lockouts and providing for compulsory arbi-
tration,8 7 provided sufficient guidelines for the just and equitable
determination of the issues.$" In answering the third argument, the
court pointed to the National Labor Relations Act8 9 which does not
define wages or hours any more specifically than does the Minnesota
statute and which has never been challenged on those grounds.00 The
court concluded that since the statute contained specific standards
and policy for the arbitrator to follow, it could not be declared void
for vagueness.91
A similar New Jersey statute, covering public utilities, survived
attack on four constitutional grounds-free speech, involuntary ser-
vitude, federal pre-emption, and due process. 92 The statute was struck
down, however, for failure to prescribe sufficient standards for arbitra-
tion.93 Shortly thereafter, an amended version of the same statute was
held a proper delegation of legislative power.9 4
The federal government recently enacted a single-use compulsory
arbitration statute. Congress, seeking to avert a nationwide rail strike,
directed the railroads and railroad unions, in effect, to submit their
unresolved differences to binding arbitration.95 The unions promptly
challenged the act and the arbitration award, but both were upheld in
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Chicago, Bur-
lington & Quincy Ry.98 The court held that the act was a proper delega-
tion of power and that the general policies set forth in the act provided
sufficient standards for the arbitrator. 97
85 241 Minn. at 543-44, 64 N.W.2d at 29-30.
86 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.40 (1966).
87 Id. §§ 179.35-.38.
88 241 Minn. at 544-47, 64 N.W.2d at 30-31.
89 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-87 (1964).
90 241 Minn. at 544-47, 64 N.W.2d at 30-31.
91 Id.
92 Van Riper v. Traffic Tel. Workers' Fed'n, 2 N.J. 335, 66 A.2d 616 (1949).
93 Id.
94 New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 5 N.J. 354, 75 A.2d 721 (1950).
95 Act of Aug. 28, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-108, 77 Stat. 132.
96 225 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 331 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 US. 918
(1964).
97 Id. at 22-23.
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Although these cases do not bind other courts in determining the
validity of statutes calling for compulsory arbitration, they are a fair
indication of the probable result. If the statute prescribes reasonable
standards for the arbitrator's decision and covers only public employees,
it should be upheld.
B. Propriety
1. Voluntary Arbitration
The most frequent objection to the propriety of arbitration of dis-
putes in public employment is that it involves an unwise delegation of
power. In reality it is a policy argument against a system of uninhibited
collective bargaining in the public sector stemming from the fear that
by submitting disputes to arbitration, powers that have been entrusted
to government officials will be given to individuals having no respon-
sibility to the electorate.98 As noted above, however, experience demon-
strates that where disputes have been submitted to arbitration, the
arbitrator is not likely to subordinate public interests.9 An endorse-
ment of collective bargaining in public employment requires a realiza-
tion that the power to make unilateral decisions on the subjects of
wages, hours, and conditions of employment must be relinquished.
Otherwise, the end result would be merely the adoption of a system of
"consultative management. " 10 If parties unable to reach a mutually
acceptable settlement of their dispute at the bargaining table agree to
abide by the decision of a neutral third party, the public is the winner
because the traditional method of settling impasses, the strike, is
avoided.
Voluntary arbitration in the public employment sector has found
support from both labor and management. AFL-CIO President George
Meany recently stated that it is effective in settling public employment
impasses and is worthy of consideration.' 0 ' The Taylor Report also
advocates its use. 0 2 The strongest argument for voluntary arbitration
is that it can be of great aid ifi th6 peaceftl settlement of disputes. But
the parties must agree to use it before it can be of help and it is doubtful
that such agreement will be forthcoming in all, or even most, disputes.
Where the parties cannot, or will not, agree to the use of voluntary
98 See Hildebrand, supra note 47, at 145; Howlett, supra note 47, at 124.
99 BNA Gov'r Emp. RatL. REP. No. 234, B-i (Mar. 4, 1968); Id. No. 129, B-12 (Feb. 28,
1966).
100 See Hart, tthe Impasse in Labor Relations in the Federal Civil Service, 19 IND. &
LAB. REL. REV. 175 (1966).
101 BNA Gov'r Emp. R.L. RFr,. No. 233, B-I (1068).
102 FINAL RxpRT, supra note 63, at 35-36.
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arbitration, the possibility of a strike is greatly increased. Therefore it is
often argued that something beyond voluntary arbitration is needed.103
2. Compulsory Arbitration
The argument favoring the use of compulsory arbitration can be
stated as follows: (1) collective bargaining is desirable; (2) strikes are
not; (3) the only way to avoid strikes is to provide a substitute; (4) the
most effective substitute is binding arbitration; 104 and (5) without
compulsion the parties are unlikely to use arbitration.
Improper delegation of power is again an objection and can be
countered by the same arguments given above. A stronger objection
is that compulsory arbitration will damage or kill free collective bar-
gaining; the parties might not engage in serious collective bargaining,
maneuvering instead for better positions to place issues before the
arbitrator. °5 This argument disregards the fact that the strike is illegal
in public employment. It is often noted that serious negotiations do not
really begin in the private sector until a strike deadline is announced,
but if no such ultimate threat exists, there is little compulsion for
compromise. Theoretically, arbitration replaces the strike threat, and
can be viewed as merely an extension of collective bargaining.' 0 The
argument might also be defeated by requiring, by statute, that the
arbitrator's decision be limited to a choice between the last offers of the
parties.10 7 Under such a system the parties would have to "realistically
appraise [their] ... position[s], and present the arbitrator with [their]
. . .minimum of acceptability and maximum concession."' 08 Such a
rule would also encourage the parties to reach an agreement on their
own after arbitration had begun, but before the arbitrator's decision
was made.
A final argument against the use of compulsory arbitration is that
there is no guarantee that it would prevent strikes. If the union is
dissatisfied with the arbitration decision, it is still likely to resort to a
103 See generally Shenton, supra note 3.
104 R. DommTY & W. OBERER, supra note 3, at 104; Howlett, supra note 47, at
123; Shenton, supra note 3, at 147.
105 R. DoHERTY & W. OoERER, supra note 3, at 104; Hildebrand, supra note 47, at 146;
Howlett, supra note 47, at 124. Howlett notes that this frequently happened under the
National War Labor Board. Id. at 125.
106 R. DOHERTY & W. OBERER, supra note 3, at 104-05.
107 The "last offer" of the parties should be the position each takes at the conclusion
of arguments before the arbitrator. This would allow the parties to compromise their dif-
ferences during arbitration if they decided that doing so would improve their case.
108 Howlett, supra note 47, at 126.
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strike to get what it wants.109 This may be true, but the enforcement
of antistrike penalties would probably be easier and more popular if
the union rejects an arbitration award and goes out on strike.110
Compulsory arbitration also tends to equalize the bargaining
power of the parties. Powerful unions would no longer be able to black-
mail the public employer into submission by denying essential services
to the public. Public employers, on the other hand, would not be able
to ignore the demands of a group of employees simply because their
union is weak or their services not quite as essential as others. The
result would be wage determinations more nearly on the basis of what
a job is really worth to the public, rather than on the basis of how
much the union can force the public to pay for it.
III
A WORKABLE SYSTEM OF ARBIRATION IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
f A system of compulsory arbitration of major disputes should be
pted in the public sector."' The law should forbid strikes and pro-
vide workable antistrike penalties. An exception to the no-strike rule
should be made when the public employer refuses to abide by the deci-
sion of the arbitrator,112 a decision limited to choosing between the last
offers of the parties. Finally, to quell at least some of the frequently ex-
pressed misgivings on the part of unions,113 only the union should be
able to initiate the arbitration proceSs.114 Thus, if the union feels that
adequate progress is being made through negotiations, it cannot be
forced into arbitration. The union could avoid the uncertainty of the
arbitration process and the basically repugnant idea of having an out-
sider deciding contract terms. Management would attempt to reach an
109 Id.
110 R. DoH nxa & W. OBESM, supra note 3, at 105. This is also true, but to a lesser
extent, where the union rejects the decision of the fact finder and goes on strike. The dif-
ference is that the fact finding is admittedly not binding on the parties here, whereas it
is expected to be legally binding on the parties in compulsory arbitration.
111 This was recently suggested by a committee formed by Gov. Romney to study the
problem. The committee recommended that it be tried on an experimental three year
basis and initially cover only police and firemen. Report of the Committee on the Law of
Government Employee Relations, 1967 ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW 175, 184.
112 R. DoamT & W. OamtEa, supra note 3, at 105.
113 See, e.g., BNA Gov'T Emp. REr.. REP. No. 233, B-1 (Feb. 26, 1968); N.Y. Times,
Feb. 19, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
114 Although this concept may be logically or politically distasteful to some, one
must note that the proposed plan deprives the union of a weapon, the strike, while not
directly disarming management.
19681
144 CORNELL LAW REVIEW
agreement under such a system without forcing the issue to arbitration
because it is no more likely than the unions to want an outsider to
determine the terms of a contract and, like the unions, it will want to
avoid the uncertainty of the arbitration process. Further, the assump-
tion that management will always want to go to arbitration includes
the unwarranted assumption that management will always refuse to
bargain in good faith. In the final analysis perhaps the best reason for
leaving the choice of arbitration to the union alone is the fact that arbi-
tration is meant to replace the strike; both are methods of last resort.
As long as the unions are forbidden to strike there is no valid reason
why they should not have the sole power to force an issue to arbitration.
James M. Ringer
